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 Research has demonstrated that people are more confident in their ability to remember 
emotional information. However, such research has almost exclusively defined emotion in terms 
of valence and arousal. Because discrete emotions also affect memory, with disgusting 
information being better remembered than frightening information, I sought to determine 
whether participants are sensitive to the effects of discrete emotion when predicting their 
memory. Participants were more confident in their memory for emotional (frightening and 
disgusting) images relative to neutral images. However, because Experiment 1a failed to 
replicate the mnemonic advantage of disgust, subsequent experiments were concerned with 
testing the replicability of this effect. The disgust advantage was ultimately replicated in an 
experiment where participants completed a concurrent secondary task at encoding. These results 
suggest that the mnemonic advantage for disgust may be more likely to manifest under divided 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Metamemory refers to the processes by which learners monitor and predict their memory 
performance. A common paradigm for studying such monitoring is to have participants make 
judgments of learning (JOLs): judgments about the extent to which they believe they will be able 
to remember information in the future. In addition to examining monitoring, metamemory 
researchers also investigate the ways in which learners control their study behavior, as when a 
participant is allowed to choose how long to study information in preparation for a memory test 
and may decide to allot study time to some items at the expense of others. The need to better 
understand metamemory is particularly salient in light of research demonstrating that people use 
metacognitive judgments to guide study behaviors (e.g., Metcalfe, 2009; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). 
Thus, understanding the cues that people use to predict their memory performance would allow 
us to optimize the way that people study and learn information.  
 A large body of metamemory research thus far has been concerned with identifying the 
cues that might influence peoples’ JOLs. When discussing examples of such metamemorial cues, 
it is helpful to consider Koriat’s (1997) cue utilization framework, a taxonomy of cues which 
differentiates between intrinsic, extrinsic, and mnemonic cues. Intrinsic cues are properties 
inherent to the study material itself, such as associative strength or word frequency. According to 
the cue utilization framework, people are typically sensitive to such cues and tend to incorporate 
them into their JOLs. An example of an intrinsic cue is semantic relatedness, or the extent to 
which words in a pair share semantic overlap. In an associative learning experiment, subjects 
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might be asked to study word pairs which differ in their relatedness, with some word pairs being 
highly related (e.g., dog-cat) and others being only weakly related (e.g., flower-pencil). Such 
research has found that greater semantic relatedness is associated with both higher JOLs and 
higher memory performance, suggesting that learners possess some amount of metacognitive 
awareness of the memory-enhancing effects of relatedness (Koriat, 1997; Rabinowitz et al., 
1982).  
 Although participants’ JOLs are likely to be influenced by such intrinsic cues, not all 
cues affect metamemory. The cue utilization framework posits the existence of a second class of 
cues: extrinsic cues, or properties of the study context external to the to-be-learned stimuli such 
as the retention interval or the presence of repeated practice (Koriat, 1997). According to the cue 
utilization framework, because such cues are not directly observable when participants predict 
their memory performance, participants tend to discount these cues relative to intrinsic cues. 
Consistent with this proposition, Shaw and Craik (1989) found that although deeper processing 
at encoding is associated with marked improvements in memory performance, participants are 
largely insensitive to this effect when making JOLs. Similarly, although repeated retrieval 
practice improves memory performance, research has found that practice does not increase JOLs 
to the same extent (Koriat et al., 2002).  
 A final category of cues posited by the cue utilization framework is the class of 
mnemonic cues, which reflect the influence of internal, phenomenological experiences during 
study which might affect learners’ JOLs (Koriat, 1997). To the extent that such internal 
experiences are correlated with memorability, the use of such cues when predicting future 
memory might result in well-calibrated JOLs. However, research has shown that at times people 
may mistake phenomenological experiences as indicators of memorability even when these 
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experiences are not associated with better memory. For instance, although people often give 
higher JOLs to materials which are processed with a greater degree of perceptual fluency, 
perceptual fluency often does not improve later memory (Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009). 
Strikingly, perceptual fluency can even have opposing effects on predicted and actual memory. 
For example, Besken and Mulligan (2014) had participants study and give JOLs to spoken words 
which were either intact (fluent) or which contained inter-spliced silence (disfluent). As 
predicted, participants gave higher JOLs to perceptually fluent words. The prediction that the 
intact words would produce the best memory was, however, a metacognitive illusion; it was the 
disfluent words which were better remembered. The existence of such a double dissociation 
between predicted and actual memory suggests that we sometimes lack proper insight into the 
factors that affect our memory, a fact which further reinforces the need to better understand 
metamemory. 
 Taken together, the aforementioned metamemory research suggests that people use a 
variety of cues to predict their memory performance. Although these cues often lead people to 
make predictions which track well with memory performance (e.g., associative strength), 
variables exist which influence memory performance but not memory predictions (e.g., levels of 
processing), and which influence predictions but not performance, or which affect predicted and 
actual memory in opposing ways (e.g., perceptual fluency). Because JOLs are subject to such 
metacognitive illusions, determining how various cues affect the calibration between JOLs and 
memory performance is an important challenge for metamemory researchers to overcome.   
 The present study is concerned with the intrinsic cue of stimulus emotionality. Given that 
people sometimes find themselves in emotionally-charged situations in which they must monitor 
the accuracy of their memory (e.g., when one experiences a crime and must determine how 
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confident they are in their memory for the details of this event), basic research on emotion and 
metamemory carries the benefit of potentially informing applied research in areas such as 
eyewitness testimony. Before I discuss research which has examined the effect of emotionality 
on JOLs, I will first briefly review basic research on emotional memory.  
 In general, laboratory research on emotion and memory has found that emotional 
information is better remembered than non-emotional information (for reviews, see Bennion et 
al., 2013; Buchanan, 2007). For example, Kensinger and Corkin (2003) tested participants’ 
recognition memory of emotional and neutral words (Experiment 1). In addition to remembering 
the emotional words more accurately than the neutral words, participants remembered the 
emotional words with a greater degree of recollection. Other studies have shown that emotion 
enhances the memorability of images as well as words. Specifically, Bradley et al. (1992) tested 
participants’ memory for emotional and neutral images using immediate and delayed free recall 
tests. As expected, emotional images were better remembered than neutral images, both 
immediately and after a one-year delay.    
 Researchers interested in explaining this emotional enhancement effect have generated a 
number of explanations as to why stimulus emotionality might enhance memory performance. 
Of note, research suggest that the mechanisms which underlie this effect depend on whether 
memory is tested immediately or at a delay. At longer retention intervals the memory-enhancing 
effects of emotion have been attributed to the beneficial effects of activity in the basolateral 
amygdala on memory consolidation (McGaugh, 2004). Indeed, research has shown that the 
performance advantage for emotional compared to neutral information becomes larger at longer 
delays, at which point amygdala-mediated consolidation processes have had a chance to act upon 
participants’ memory traces. For example, in a series of experiments Sharot and Phelps (2004) 
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tested participants’ recognition memory for emotion and neutral words both immediately and 
after a 24-hour delay. Their results showed that the effect of emotion and memory performance 
was moderated by retention interval, such that whereas participants’ memory for neutral 
information become significantly worse over time, participant’s memory for emotional 
information either became better or remained the same. 
 In contrast, the immediate effects of emotion on memory have typically been explained 
by a set of cognitive factors. Specifically, Talmi and colleagues have found that the immediate 
effects of emotion might be explained in terms of the combined effects of relatedness and 
distinctiveness (Talmi et al., 2007; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). Emotional items are often 
perceived as having greater thematic relatedness due to their shared emotional nature. For 
example, because the words “death” and “pain” are both aversive, these words might be 
perceived as more related than the neutral words “chair” and “coffee”. In addition to being more 
interrelated, emotional information is thought to be more distinctive. According to Talmi et al. 
(2007), because emotional information is more likely to be relevant to currently active goals than 
neutral information (e.g., an image of a gun is relevant to the goal of survival, whereas an image 
of a shoe is not; Lazarus, 1991), emotional information possesses the unique feature of goal 
relevance. When emotional items are presented alongside neutral items in mixed lists, their goal 
relevance may cause them to stand out, making them relatively more distinctive. Given that both 
distinctive and related information are better remembered (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993), the 
increased distinctiveness and relatedness of emotional information might be part of what makes 
it more memorable.   
In order to test whether increased relatedness mediated the effect of emotion on 
immediate memory, Talmi et al. (2007) conducted a series of experiments in which participants 
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studied three types of images: unrelated emotional images, unrelated neutral images, and highly 
inter-related neutral images. In order to simultaneously examine the mediating effects of 
distinctiveness, the authors manipulated whether participants studied pure lists comprised of only 
a single stimulus type, or mixed lists which were composed of both emotional and neutral 
images. The rationale for this pure/mixed list manipulation was that although an emotional item 
might stand out relative to neutral items in a mixed list, this same item would be less distinctive 
compared to an entire list of similarly emotional items. Talmi et al. found that although 
relatedness and distinctiveness did not explain the effects of emotion on memory independently, 
these factors did explain the emotional advantage together; emotional images were not better 
remembered than inter-related neutral images in pure lists. In sum, the extant research suggests 
that emotional information is better remembered than neutral information, and that for immediate 
tests the emotional memory advantage is explained by the higher relatedness and distinctiveness 
of emotional information, and at a delay these cognitive factors are supplemented by amygdala-
mediated consolidation advantages (see Talmi, 2013 for a review).  
When considering the effect of emotion on episodic memory, researchers have primarily 
operationalized emotion in terms of two affective dimensions: valence and arousal. Valence 
refers to the extent to which a stimulus evokes positive or negative affect. Arousal refers to the 
level of excitement or intensity that an emotional stimulus evokes, regardless of its valence. For 
example, although an image of a funeral and a gruesome operation are both negatively valenced, 
the latter is more intense (higher in arousal) than the former. Valence and arousal are often 
confounded in memory research, such that emotional items might not only be significantly more 
valenced (positively or negatively) than the neutral items they are compared to, but also more 
arousing. Although it is therefore often difficult to make inferences about the unique effects of 
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valence and arousal on memory performance, some research has specifically addressed this 
issue. For example, Kensinger and Corkin (2004) disentangled the mechanisms underlying the 
mnemonic effects of arousal and valence by having participants study neutral words, negative 
and arousing words (i.e. “rape”), and negative and non-arousing words (i.e. “sorrow”) under full 
or divided attention. Whereas the memory advantage for negative, non-arousing words compared 
to neutral words was present in the full attention condition, this benefit disappeared under 
divided attention. This suggests that the unique effect of valence on memory may be due to 
controlled, resource-demanding processes such as elaboration. In contrast, the memory 
advantage for negative, arousing words relative to neutral words was present in both the full and 
divided attention conditions. This suggests that the effects of arousal are due to more automatic, 
resource-sparing processes such as automatic attention capture. Such results support the 
distinction between valence and arousal in memory research. 
 Despite the large body of research which has examined the effect of stimulus 
emotionality on memory performance, much less is known about how emotion affects 
metamemory. What little research exists suggests that – consistent with emotionality’s 
classification as an intrinsic cue (Koriat, 1997) – emotion does indeed impact metamemorial 
judgments, with people giving higher JOLs for emotional items compared to neutral items (e.g., 
Hourihan & Bursey, 2017; Hourihan et al., 2017; Nomi et al., 2013; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; 
Tauber et al., 2017; Witherby & Tauber, 2018; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). In the following 
paragraphs I will review the extant metamemory research which has examined the effect of 
emotion on JOLs, which has focused mostly on the effects of valence and arousal.  
 What little emotional metamemory research exists has consistently found that regardless 
of whether emotion enhances memory performance, people give higher JOLs to items with 
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higher levels of valence (both positive and negative) and arousal. For example, Zimmerman and 
Kelley (2010) found that participants gave higher JOLs to emotional (both positive and negative) 
relative to neutral words in preparation for free and cued recall tests.1 Other researchers have 
replicated these findings by demonstrating that participants give higher JOLs to emotional words 
(Hourihan et al., 2017; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012). In addition to words, researchers have 
demonstrated that emotional images are given higher JOLs than neutral images (Hourihan & 
Bursey, 2017; Tauber et al., 2017). Hourihan and Bursey (2017) – for example – presented 
participants with positive and neutral images and found that, although positive valence did not 
consistently enhance recognition performance, participants gave higher JOLs to positive 
compared to neutral images. Lastly, research has demonstrated that participants give higher JOLs 
to faces displaying emotionally charged facial expressions as well (i.e. smiling, frowning; Nomi 
et al., 2013; Witherby & Tauber, 2018). As an example, Nomi et al. (2013) had participants 
study and give JOLs to angry, happy, and neutral facial expressions in preparation for a 
recognition test and found that participants gave higher JOLs to angry and happy faces compared 
to neutral faces.  
 Notably, although many of the aforementioned studies of emotional metamemory have 
confounded valence and arousal, Hourihan et al. (2017) manipulated valence and arousal 
independently in order to disentangle the effects of these dimensions. Specifically, the authors 
varied arousal but not valence in one experiment (Experiment 1), and valence but not arousal in 
another (Experiment 2). Their results showed that both valence and arousal are independently 
associated with higher JOLs (but see Tauber et al., 2017). Taken together, this research – 
 
1 Because the positive and negative words were also more arousing than the neutral words, it is not possible to 
disentangle the unique effects of valence and arousal on JOLs in this study 
9 
although preliminary – suggests that participants are sensitive to valence and arousal when 
predicting their memory performance.  
 In order to determine the mechanism by which emotion influences JOLs, Hourihan et al. 
(2017) contrasted two potential causes of the JOL-enhancing effects of emotion. According to 
the authors, the influence of emotion on JOLs might be due either to an unconscious process by 
which participants mistake the physiological sensation of arousal as an indicator of memorability 
(the “physiological account”), or a conscious process by which participants apply beliefs about 
the effects of emotion on memory to their performance predictions (the “cognitive account”).2 In 
order to test these mechanisms, Hourihan et al. had participants study and give JOLs for words 
which varied in arousal but not valence (Experiment 1) or which varied in valence but not 
arousal (Experiment 2). In contrast to the physiological account, which predicts a unique effect 
of arousal but not valence on JOLs, participants gave higher JOLs to both valenced and arousing 
words. To further compare the physiological and cognitive accounts of emotionally-enhanced 
JOLs, the authors varied valence and arousal continuously within a single list in order to make 
each word’s emotional status less distinct/noticeable relative to other items in the list 
(Experiment 3). The authors reasoned that if emotional words are given higher JOLs due to the 
application of a belief about memory, emotional words should only be given higher JOLs when 
the emotional nature of such words is obvious to participants as they make JOLs. Consistent with 
the cognitive account, valence and arousal did not influence JOLs when the items’ emotional 
status was made less obvious. Thus, research suggests that participants give higher JOLs to 
valenced and arousing stimuli, likely because participants apply a (potentially implicit) belief 
that emotional items will be better remembered than neutral items.  
 
2 These explanations are similar to Koriat’s (1997) distinction between experience-based and theory-based 
contributions to JOLs respectively. 
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 An important limitation of emotional metamemory thus far is that this research has 
almost exclusively defined emotion in terms of valence and arousal. Such research makes the 
assumption that emotional experience can be sufficiently explained in terms of such continuous 
properties, a proposition shared by dimensional models of emotion (Barrett, 2006; Russell, 
1980). According to Russell’s (1980) circumplex model of affect – for example – emotional 
experiences can be sufficiently described in terms of the intersection between the continuous 
dimensions of arousal and valence. Excitement, for example, is an emotional state which 
combines positive valence with high arousal, whereas depression combines negative valence 
with low arousal.  
 Whereas such models characterize emotions according to continuous dimensions, other 
researchers have taken a different approach. Specifically, discrete models of emotion claim that 
conceptualizing emotion in terms of dimensions such as valence and arousal is an 
oversimplification. Instead, discrete models posit that qualitative differences between the various 
discrete categories of emotion (i.e. fear, disgust, sadness, anger) reflect important properties of 
emotion which are not appreciated by models which reduce emotions to their dimensional 
components (Ekman, 1992). Indeed, emotional theorists have suggested that various emotions 
are associated with unique, situationally relevant patterns of motivation and behavior (Frijda, 
1987). Fear – for example – is evoked when one encounters a threat to well-being, and motivates 
one to avoid that threat. In contrast, anger is evoked when one encounters an obstacle that 
impedes progress towards a currently active goal, and motivates one to confront and remove this 
obstacle. To the extent that differences between emotional categories are an inherent aspect of 
emotional experience, it might be predicted that discrete emotional categories should have 
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unique effects on memory above and beyond the effects of valence and arousal (for a similar 
argument, see Levine & Pizarro, 2004; Levine & Edelstein, 2009).  
 Evidence in favor of discrete models of emotion as applied to episodic memory can be 
seen in research on memory for disgusting information. A number of studies using a variety of 
materials have found that disgusting information is better remembered than frightening 
information (Chapman, 2018; Chapman et al., 2013; Charash & McKay, 2002; Croucher et al., 
2011; Ferré et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018), suggesting that disgust has a relatively privileged 
place in episodic memory compared to the similarly negative, avoidance-oriented emotion fear 
(but see Marchewka et al., 2016, who did not find a significant difference in recognition between 
disgusting and frightening images). Notably, researchers have found that even after equating 
disgusting and frightening images in terms of arousal, valence, subjective distinctiveness, visual 
complexity, and semantic relatedness, disgusting images are still remembered better than 
frightening images (Chapman, 2018; Chapman et al., 2013). The fact that the advantage for 
disgusting information in immediate memory persists even after relatedness and distinctiveness 
have been equated suggests that the mechanisms which explain the mnemonic advantage for 
disgusting information might differ from those that explain the advantage for emotion defined 
more broadly (Talmi et al., 2007; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). In addition to being better 
remembered, evidence suggests that when matched for valence, disgusting images are 
recognized with a greater degree of recollection than frightening images (Croucher et al., 2011). 
 In addition to demonstrating this disgust advantage with images, researchers have found 
that disgusting words are better remembered than frightening words when the two categories are 
equated for arousal and valence (Ferré et al., 2018). Similarly, Zhang et al. (2018) demonstrated 
better recognition for disgusted relative to fearful faces. The finding that disgusting information 
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is better remembered than frightening information is difficult to explain from the perspective of 
dimensional models of emotion, which tend to focus on valence and arousal as the sole causes of 
emotionally enhanced memory.  
 In light of research indicating that learners are sensitive to the effects of emotion when 
making JOLs, as well as research suggesting that the effects of emotion on episodic memory 
cannot be completely explained by dimensional models of emotion, the present study sought to 
determine whether learners are sensitive to discrete emotions when predicting their memory 
performance. More specifically, the present study sought to determine whether the differential 
effects of disgust and fear on episodic memory performance would generalize to metamemory 
judgments.   
 Because discrete models of emotion highlight the importance of distinguishing between 
the effects of categorically different emotions, these models suggest that discrete emotions such 
as disgust might differentially affect cognition in general, and memory and metamemory in 
particular. Despite this possibility, there is preliminary evidence suggesting that people may be 
insensitive to discrete emotional categories when predicting their memory performance. 
Specifically, Witherby and Tauber (2018) presented participants with facial expressions 
displaying angry, sad, fearful, and neutral expressions and asked them to make JOLs in 
preparation for a recognition test. Whereas participants gave higher JOLs to negative compared 
to neutral expressions, JOLs did not differ between angry, sad, and fearful expressions.  
 Although it is therefore possible that learners are not sensitive to discrete emotion when 
making JOLs, an important limitation of this study renders such a conclusion premature: memory 
performance did not differ between angry, sad, and fearful expressions. The finding that memory 
performance did not differ between emotions has two possible explanations. First, it is possible 
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that although stimuli from certain emotional categories such as disgust and fear differ in their 
memorability, stimuli from other categories like anger and sadness do not. It is also possible that 
the stimuli in Witherby and Tauber’s (2018) study did not differ in their memorability because 
the authors used facial expressions rather than words or images. Because images and words are 
intended to evoke an emotional reaction whereas facial expressions are simply the reflection of 
an emotional reaction in another person, it is possible that the principles which govern the 
emotional memory of words and images might differ from those which govern the recognition of 
emotional expressions.  
 Due to the lack of a difference in memory between the emotional faces in Witherby and 
Tauber’s study, it is remains possible that learners are sensitive to discrete emotions when 
making JOLs, but only when such discrete emotions actually have differential effects on 
memory. After all, in a situation where discrete emotions are equally memorable, participants are 
right to assign these categories equivalent JOLs. A stronger test of the effects of discrete 
emotions on metamemory would be to see whether participants assign different JOLs to 
emotional categories which actually differ in memorability. Given that disgust has consistently 
been shown to enhance memory performance relative to fear, it is the ideal emotion to test 











CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 1A 
 The aim of Experiment 1a was to test whether disgusting images are given higher JOLs 
than equally arousing and negatively valenced frightening images. In doing so, I sought to 
determine whether discrete or dimensional models of emotion more accurately apply to 
metamemory. From the perspective of dimensional models of emotion, it might be predicted that 
only valence and arousal should impact metamemorial judgments, and that after equating 
frightening and disgusting images for these dimensions, participants will not differ in their JOLs 
for frightening and disgusting images. Indeed, this outcome would be consistent with theorizing 
in emotional metamemory research thus far, which has implicated valence and arousal as being 
central to the effects of emotion on metamemory (see Hourihan et al., 2017; Tauber et al., 2017). 
If dimensions such as valence and arousal affect metamemory but discrete emotions do not, this 
might result in a situation in which actual and predicted memory conflict, resulting in a 
metamemorial illusion. Specifically, if disgusting images are better remembered than frightening 
images but participants do not give disgusting images higher JOLs, participants may be 
underconfident in their memory for disgust by failing to take the mnemonic advantage for 
disgust into account.  
 However, even after equating disgusting and frightening stimuli for valence and arousal, 
it is possible that participants may assign higher JOLs to disgusting compared to frightening 
images. Hourihan et al.’s (2017) results suggest that participants give higher JOLs to emotional 
items because they notice their emotionality relative to neutral items and apply a belief about 
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memorability to their performance predictions. Although participants in the present experiment 
will no longer have the cues of valence and arousal, they will have the intrinsic cue of discrete 
emotion. Thus, to the extent that participants notice and differentiate between the different types 
of emotions elicited by a disgusting cockroach and a threatening gun – for example – one might 
predict that participants will incorporate these reactions into their JOLs. Such a result would 
suggest that the differential effects of emotional categories suggested by discrete models of 
emotion apply not just to memory performance, but to metamemorial judgments as well.   
Method 
 The design of Experiment 1 was based on a prior study which found the disgust 
advantage in free recall using frightening and disgusting images equated for valence, arousal, 
and relatedness (Chapman, 2018; Experiment 1). The design of the present experiment and 
Chapman’s experiment differed only in that 1) participants in our study provided JOLs and 
therefore engaged in intentional rather than incidental encoding and 2) participants did not 
complete the line discrimination task which Chapman used to assess attentional biases towards 
different emotions during encoding. Given that an earlier study Chapman et al. (2013; 
Experiment 3) found that the disgust advantage in recognition did not depend on whether 
participants engaged in the line discrimination task during encoding, I did not expect this detail 
to affect our results. Because no study to our knowledge has examined whether the disgust 
advantage for image recall is present during intentional encoding, or when participants make 






The procedures in this paper were approved by the Office of Human Research Ethics of 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Our sample size was chosen by using an a priori 
power analysis based on the size of the main effect of Emotion (3: disgust, fear, neutral) on recall 
performance reported by Chapman (η2p = 0.33; 2018; Experiment 1). This power analysis 
indicated that a sample size of 25 participants would be sufficient to achieve 99% power. As 
such, participants were 25 undergraduate students who were compensated for their participation 
with course credit.     
Design and Materials  
The design of Experiment 1a was a 3 (emotion: disgust, fear, neutral) x 2 (memory 
measure: predicted [JOL] vs. actual memory performance) within-subjects design. The images 
used were obtained from Chapman (2018; Experiment 1), who obtained images from internet 
searches, as well as from a prior study demonstrating the disgust advantage (Chapman et al., 
2013). The materials consisted of photographs of 14 disgusting (e.g., insects, medical 
operations), 14 frightening (e.g., dangerous animals, war), and 14 neutral (e.g., coat, basket) 
stimuli. Pilot data from Chapman’s (2018) study indicated that the frightening and disgusting 
images were equally arousing and negatively valenced. Additionally, Chapman found that 
although disgusting images were rated as more disgusting than the frightening images and 
frightening images were rated as more frightening than the disgusting images, the disgusting 
images were as disgusting as the frightening images were frightening. These data suggest that 
participants perceived the stimuli as belonging to the appropriate emotional category, and that 
the two categories did not differ in the degree of discrete emotion that they evoked. Lastly, 
Chapman calculated relatedness by presenting subjects with pairs of disgusting images and pairs 
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of frightening images and asking them to rate their relatedness using a Likert scale. After 
quantifying the relatedness of each image by calculating the average relatedness rating for a 
given image with every other image in its emotional category, Chapman found that the 
disgusting and frightening images did not differ in their relatedness.3 
Procedure 
Experiment 1 consisted of four phases: a study phase, a 45 min delay, a free recall test, 
and a stimulus-rating phase. During the study phase, participants were first told that they would 
study a series of images in preparation for an upcoming memory test which would occur 
approximately 45 min later. Each trial began with a 500 ms blank screen, after which a random 
image was presented for 2 s, with image order being randomized anew for each subject. After 
another 500 ms blank screen, participants were asked to rate how confident they were that they 
would be able to remember the image in 45 min. JOLs were self-paced and were made on a 0 to 
100 scale, with 0 meaning “not confident at all” and 100 meaning “extremely confident”. 
Participants were encouraged to use the entire scale. After studying and making JOLs for all 42 
images, participants completed a series of unrelated tasks for 45 min. Specifically, participants 
read a series of emotionally-neutral, educational passages related to geology and answered 
comprehension questions about their content. 
 After a 45 min delay, participants’ memory was tested using a free recall test. During the 
recall test, participants were provided with a sheet of lined paper and were instructed to write 
down a brief description (i.e. a few words) of any image that they could remember regardless of 
 
3 Because Chapman (2018) only assessed relatedness for disgusting and frightening images during her pilot 
experiment, it is unclear whether the emotional images used were normatively more related than the neutral images. 
However, because our primary theoretical interests in the present study have to do with the comparison between the 
frightening and disgusting images, this issue is not directly relevant to the current investigation.   
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presentation order. The recall testes lasted a maximum of 10 mins, but participants could 
terminate the test early if they felt that they could not recall any more images.  
Lastly, participants were shown all 42 images once again in a random order and were 
asked to rate each image in terms of its valence, arousal, disgust, and fear using a series of 1-7 
Likert scales. Asking participants to provide such ratings was useful in that doing so allowed me 
to determine whether the images had indeed been correctly matched for potential confounds such 
as valence and arousal within our specific sample. Participants were tested individually, and the 
entire procedure took approximately 75 mins. 
Data Analysis 
 Recall performance was coded by two independent raters (myself and a trained 
undergraduate research assistant). Every written description was coded as either referring to a 
specific studied image or as not referring to a studied image (i.e. an intrusion).4 Consequently, 
certain descriptions which were too vague to determine which image was being remembered 
were marked as intrusions (e.g., “something gross”). All disagreements were resolved through 
discussion.  
Of the 404 descriptions written down across 25 participants, there were 18 disagreements 
between raters (i.e. raters agreed on 95.6% of descriptions). Additionally, subjects’ average 
recall performance correlated very highly between raters (r = 0.98). Because recall scoring was 
determined to be highly reliable, in subsequent experiments recall was coded by a single rater 
only (myself).    
Analyses for the following experiments consisted primarily of a series of mixed and 
repeated-measures ANOVAs. Following the recommendations of Girden (1992), whenever 
 
4 Intrusions were infrequent across all experiments: [Experiment 1a: (M = 0.44, SD = 0.65), Experiment 1b: (M = 
0.64, SD = 0.99), Experiment 2: (M = 0.50, SD = 1.06)]. 
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Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity indicated a significant violation of sphericity, the Huynh-Feldt 
correction was applied for values of epsilon above 0.75 and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was applied for values of epsilon below 0.75. Post-hoc analyses consisted of pairwise 
comparisons of means with Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons.5 Within-subjects 
confidence intervals displayed in figures were constructed according to the methods described by 
Morey (2008). All analyses were conducted using R version 3.6.2.   
Results 
Recall and JOLs 
 I began by conducting a 3 (Emotion: disgusting, frightening, neutral) x 2 (Measure: 
predicted [JOL] vs. actual memory performance) repeated-measures ANOVA (see Figure 1). 
Conducting a repeated-measures ANOVA which includes the Measure factor allows one to test 
for effects of emotion on calibration: the extent to which predicted memory matches actual 
memory. In other words, if emotional categories were differentially associated with 
overconfidence or underconfidence, this analysis would reveal such effects. 
This analysis revealed a main effect of Emotion [F(2, 48) = 51.53, p < 0.001, η2p = 
0.682], reflecting higher predicted and actual memory for emotional relative to neutral images. 
The nature of this effect is expanded upon in subsequent analyses below. Additionally, there was 
a main effect of Measure [F(1, 24) = 13.37, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.358], reflecting the fact that 
participants were generally overconfident in their predictions. There was – however – no 
significant interaction between Emotion and Measure (F = 2.26, p = 0.115). As such, calibration 
did not vary by emotion. 
 
5 Rather than dividing alpha by the number of comparisons, a mathematically equivalent approach was taken in 
which p-values were adjusted by multiplying the uncorrected p-values by the number of comparisons and setting 
their maximum value to 1. As such, all instances in which post-hoc p-values are equal to 1 reflect instances in which 
the corrected p-values would have exceeded 1 after multiplication. 
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In order to examine the effects of emotion on recall performance specifically, a repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted with Emotion (3) as a within-subjects factor. There was a 
significant effect of Emotion on recall performance [F(2, 48) = 11.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.317]. 
Post-hoc tests revealed that participants recalled fewer neutral images compared to both 
frightening (p = 0.002) and disgusting images (p < 0.001). However, participants did not differ in 
their recall of frightening and disgusting images (p = 1.000).  
Next, a repeated-measures ANOVA with Emotion (3) as a within-subjects factor was 
conducted on JOLs. Similar to the analysis of recall performance, there was a significant effect 
of Emotion on JOLs [F(2, 48) = 61.07, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.718]. Post-hoc tests revealed that 
neutral images were given lower JOLs than both frightening and disgusting images (both p’s < 
0.001). However, participants did not differ in their JOLs for disgusting and frightening images 














Recall and Judgments of Learning by Emotion in Experiment 1a 
Note. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
Resolution 
 Next, I analyzed resolution, a measure of relative metamemorial accuracy which 
quantifies the extent to which participants are able to discriminate between items which are 
subsequently remembered vs. forgotten. This measure is obtained by computing Goodman–
Kruskal gamma correlations between JOLs and memory performance at the item-level (Nelson, 
1984), with positive values indicating higher JOLs for remembered images, negative values 
indicating higher JOLs for forgotten images, and zero indicating chance-level metacognitive 
discrimination between remembered and forgotten images. I did not have any a priori hypotheses 
regarding resolution and analyzed this measure for completeness. 
Recall Judgments of Learning

















 First, a repeated-measures ANOVA of resolution with Emotion (3) as a factor was 
conducted (see Figure 2). This analysis did not reveal a significant effect of Emotion (F = 1.97, p 
= 0.151), suggesting that participants’ relative accuracy did not differ between emotions. Next, 
the resolution for each emotional category was compared to zero (i.e. chance-level 
discrimination) using a series of one-sample t-tests. Whereas the resolution associated with 
disgusting [t(24) = 5.01, p < 0.001] and frightening [t(24) = 4.32, p < 0.001] images was greater 
than zero, resolution for neutral images did not differ from zero [t(24) = 1.07, p = 0.295].  
Figure 2  
Resolution by Emotion in Experiment 1a 







































 Finally, a series of repeated-measures ANOVAs with Emotion (3) as a factor were 
conducted on each of the four ratings to determine whether the images evoked the desired 
affective responses (see Table 1). A significant effect of Emotion on valence ratings [F(2, 48) = 
166.76, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.874] indicated that neutral images were rated as more positively 
valenced than both frightening and disgusting images (both p’s < 0.001). Frightening and 
disgusting images did not differ in valence (p = 1.000). There was a significant effect of Emotion 
on arousal ratings as well [F(2, 48) = 180.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.882]. Post-hoc tests revealed that 
neutral images were rated as less arousing than both frightening and disgusting images (both p’s 
< 0.001). Notably, frightening images were rated as more arousing than disgusting images (p < 
0.001). A significant effect of Emotion on fear ratings [F(2, 48) = 183.49, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.884] 
revealed that neutral images were less frightening than frightening and disgusting images (both 
p’s < 0.001), and frightening images were more frightening than disgusting images (p < 0.001). 
There was also a significant effect of Emotion on disgust ratings [F(2, 48) = 201.57, p < 0.001, 
η2p = 0.894]. Neutral images were rated as less disgusting than both frightening and disgusting 
images (both p’s < 0.001). Additionally, disgusting images were rated as more disgusting than 
frightening images (p < 0.001). Lastly, a paired t-test comparing average fear ratings for 
frightening images to average disgust ratings for disgusting images revealed no significant 
difference in ratings [t(24) = 0.406, p = 0.688], suggesting that the frightening images were as 






Mean (SD) Valence, Arousal, Fear, and Disgust Ratings for Images in Experiment 1a 
 Emotion Category 
Rating Disgusting Frightening Neutral 
Valence 2.25 (0.58) 2.11 (0.70) 4.60 (0.40) 
Arousal 4.79 (0.61) 5.63 (0.62) 2.71 (0.72) 
Fear 4.15 (1.28) 5.36 (0.90) 1.42 (0.48) 
Disgust 5.30 (0.89) 3.04 (1.26) 1.24 (0.40) 
 
Discussion 
 The results of Experiment 1a are consistent with some lines of research but not with 
others. In the present experiment, there was a significant effect of emotion on memory 
performance. This effect was characterized by the tendency for participants to remember both 
disgusting and frightening images better than neutral images. Such results are consistent with the 
emotional memory literature at large, which has consistently demonstrated that emotional 
information is better remembered than neutral information (for reviews, see Bennion et al., 2013; 
Buchanan, 2007).  
 The effect of emotion on JOLs observed in the present experiment is also consistent with 
prior research (e.g., Hourihan & Bursey, 2017; Hourihan et al., 2017; Nomi et al., 2013; Tauber 
& Dunlosky, 2012; Tauber et al., 2017; Witherby & Tauber, 2018; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). 
Much like the effect of emotion on actual memory performance, participants gave higher JOLs 
for emotional images relative to neutral images. Such results suggest that – consistent with the 
cue utilization framework (Koriat, 1997) – participants are indeed sensitive to the general cue of 
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stimulus emotionality when predicting their memory performance and are (rightly) more 
confident in their ability to remember emotional images. Strikingly, the effect of emotion on 
JOLs was more than twice as large as the effect of emotion on actual memory (η2p = 0.718 vs. η
2
p 
= 0.317). Thus, it appears that participants might not simply be sensitive to emotion when 
making metamemorial judgments, they may be oversensitive to emotion.  
 Although these general effects of emotion on predicted and actual memory replicate prior 
research, the present experiment failed to replicate the disgust advantage in recall. Whereas prior 
research has suggested that disgusting information is better remembered than frightening 
information (Chapman, 2018; Chapman et al., 2013; Charash & McKay, 2002; Croucher et al., 
2011; Ferré et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018), participants in the current study remembered 
disgusting and frightening images equally well. Possible reasons for this lack of replication are 
discussed in the following section (see Experiment 1b’s Introduction). 
 As with actual memory, participants gave disgusting and frightening images equivalent 
JOLs. That is, although participants were more confident in their ability to remember both 
disgusting and frightening images relative to neutral images, participants did not differ in their 
confidence for disgusting and frightening images. Although it might therefore be tempting to 
conclude that participants are not sensitive to the cue of discrete emotion when predicting their 
memory performance, such a conclusion would be premature. As mentioned previously, in order 
to provide an appropriate test of whether participants are sensitive to discrete emotion when 
making JOLs, it would first be necessary to demonstrate that discrete emotions do indeed differ 
in their memorability. Indeed, the lack of a difference in memorability between discrete emotions 
in Witherby and Tauber’s study (2018) is what motivated the present investigation. Without such 
a difference in memorability, it may be that participants are sensitive to discrete emotion, but 
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only when discrete emotion actually affects memory. As such – due to the lack of a disgust 
advantage in the present experiment – I am unable to draw definitive conclusions about whether 
discrete emotions affect JOLs. 
 In addition to the primary results of this experiment, data on stimulus ratings and 
resolution were also analyzed. Regarding stimulus ratings, the results of the present experiment 
replicated Chapman’s (2018; Experiment 1) results exactly: disgusting and frightening images 
did not differ in valence, frightening images were more frightening than disgusting images, 
disgusting images were more disgusting than frightening images, and frightening images were as 
frightening as disgusting images were disgusting. Such findings provide support for the stability 
of participants’ appraisals of these images. Notably, the frightening images were rated as being 
significantly more arousing than the disgusting images. These results are consistent with 
Chapman’s, who found that – although the two image categories were equated for arousal based 
on pilot data – the disgusting images were rated as less arousing than the frightening images 
during the memory experiment. The implications of this finding are discussed in the following 
section. As will be demonstrated in subsequent experiments, the consistently found difference 
between frightening and disgusting images in terms of arousal suggests that the images used by 
Chapman to represent these two emotional categories may not be properly equated in terms of 
arousal.  
 Lastly, analyses of participants’ resolution demonstrated that although resolution was 
above chance for both frightening and disgusting images (but not neutral images), resolution did 
not differ as a function of emotion. This null result is consistent with the emotional metamemory 
literature at large, which has repeatedly found that emotion does not affect resolution (Hourihan 
& Bursey, 2017; Hourihan et al., 2017; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Tauber et al., 2017; Witherby 
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& Tauber, 2018; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). As such, although emotion affects the magnitude 
of JOLs, it does not appear to influence participants’ ability to discriminate between items which 

























CHAPTER 3: EXPERIMENT 1B 
 The results of Experiment 1a failed to replicate the disgust advantage. As mentioned 
previously, this lack of replication precludes the investigation of discrete emotional effects on 
metamemory. As such, rather than investigating issues of metamemory as originally intended, 
the remainder of this thesis will be concerned with determining the replicability of the disgust 
advantage in memory. 
 There are a number of factors which might explain our failure to replicate the disgust 
advantage in Exp 1a. First, in Experiment 1a frightening images were rated as more arousing 
than disgusting images. Given that arousal has been found to increase memory independently of 
valence (e.g., Kensinger & Corkin, 2004), one might wonder whether the increased arousal of 
frightening images might have prevented the disgust advantage from manifesting. Although 
plausible, given that Chapman (2018; Experiment 1) observed the disgust advantage using the 
same materials used here in a sample which also rated the frightening images as more arousing 
than the disgusting images, this explanation seems unlikely. That is, because Chapman’s results 
demonstrate that the disgust advantage can still be found when using frightening and disgusting 
images which are not equated for arousal, this confound is likely not responsible for our failure 
to replicate this effect.6 
 Another, more likely explanation concerns the effects of making JOLs on memory 
performance. Prior research has found that asking participants to make JOLs sometimes 
 
6 The results of Experiment 2 also argue against this explanation in that the disgust advantage was observed despite 
a significant difference between frightening and disgusting images in terms of arousal. 
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eliminates otherwise robust memory effects. For example, although information which has been 
perceptually degraded is typically better remembered than perceptually intact information (e.g., 
Nairne, 1988), Besken and Mulligan (2013) found that having participants make JOLs after each 
item eliminated this effect. Similarly, JOLs have been found to eliminate the generation effect 
(Begg et al., 1991; Matvey et al., 2001), an effect whereby information which participants 
generate themselves is better remembered than information which is not self-generated 
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978).  
 Although Experiment 1b was not designed to test the exact mechanisms by which JOLs 
may have eliminated the disgust advantage, prior research suggests two possibilities. It has been 
suggested that JOLs might eliminate memory effects either because 1) JOLs encourage deep 
processing of the less memorable class of materials, thereby equalizing memory performance 
and eliminating differences between categories of materials, or 2) JOLs divert attention away 
from the studied materials and towards the JOLs (Besken & Mulligan, 2013). Within the context 
of the present investigation, JOLs might have eliminated the disgust advantage by increasing the 
depth of processing of frightening images, or by diverting attention away from the disgusting 
images. Rather than investigating whether these specific explanations apply to the current 
findings, the goal of Experiment 1b was to first establish whether JOLs do indeed eliminate the 
disgust advantage.   
  Given these considerations, the purpose of Experiment 1b was to test whether the failure 
to replicate the disgust advantage in Experiment 1a was due to the presence of JOLs. As such, 
the design of Experiment 1b was similar to that of Experiment 1a except that participants were 
no longer asked to make JOLs. This experiment therefore addressed questions both about the 
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 As in Experiment 1a, participants were 25 undergraduate students who were compensated 
for their participation with course credit.   
Design, Materials, and Procedure  
 The methods were identical to Experiment 1a with the following exception: participants 
in Experiment 1b no longer made JOLs during encoding. As such, during the encoding phase 
participants simply studied each image for 2 s in preparation for an upcoming memory test. As in 
Experiment 1a, encoding was intentional. 
Results 
Recall 
 Recall was analyzed using a repeated-measures ANOVA with Emotion (3) as a factor 
(see Figure 3). The results of Experiment 1b replicate those of Experiment 1a. Specifically, there 
was a significant effect of Emotion on recall performance [F(2, 48) = 17.53, p < 0.001, η2p = 
0.422]. Post-hoc revealed that participants recalled fewer neutral images compared to both 
disgusting and frightening images (both p’s < 0.001). Participants did not differ in their recall of 





7 One participant in Experiment 1b became distressed upon seeing the emotional images during the encoding phase 
and terminated the experiment. This subject was replaced. 
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Figure 3 
Recall by Emotion in Experiment 1b
Note. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
Stimulus Ratings 
 Next, stimulus ratings for valence, arousal, fear, and disgust were analyzed using a series 
of repeated-measures ANOVAs with Emotion (3) as a factor (see Table 2). As with recall, the 
stimulus ratings replicated the results of Experiment 1a exactly. Specifically, there was a 
significant effect of Emotion on valence ratings [F(1.58, 37.88) = 154.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 
0.866], indicating that neutral images were rated more positively than both frightening and 
disgusting images (both p’s < 0.001). Frightening and disgusting images did not differ in their 
valence (p = 1.000). There was also a significant effect of Emotion on arousal ratings [F(2, 48) = 

















arousing than both frightening and disgusting images (both p’s < 0.001). Frightening images 
were rated as more arousing than disgusting images (p < 0.001). There was a significant effect of 
Emotion on fear ratings [F(2, 48) = 181.81, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.883]. Frightening images were 
rated as more frightening than disgusting images (p < 0.001), and neutral images were rated as 
less frightening than both frightening and disgusting images (both p’s < 0.001). Similarly, there 
was a significant effect of Emotion on disgust ratings [F(2, 48) = 172.94, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.878]. 
Disgusting images were rated as more disgusting than frightening images (p < 0.001), and 
neutral images were rated as less disgusting than both frightening and disgusting images (both 
p’s < 0.001). Lastly, a paired t-test indicated that the frightening images were as frightening as 
the disgusting images were disgusting [t(24) = -0.217, p = 0.830]. 
Table 2  
Mean (SD) Valence, Arousal, Fear, and Disgust Ratings for Images in Experiment 1b 
 Emotion Category 
Rating Disgusting Frightening Neutral 
Valence 2.41 (0.51) 2.31 (0.56) 4.89 (0.65) 
Arousal 4.95 (0.63) 5.68 (0.61) 2.72 (0.89) 
Fear 3.89 (1.32) 5.12 (1.08) 1.29 (0.38) 
Disgust 5.16 (0.98) 3.07 (1.28) 1.11 (0.20) 
 
Discussion 
 The goal of Experiment 1b was to investigate whether the failure to replicate the disgust 
advantage in Experiment 1a was due to the inclusion of JOLs. This hypothesis was motivated by 
research demonstrating that item-by-item JOLs sometimes eliminate well-established memory 
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effects (e.g., Begg et al., 1991; Besken & Mulligan, 2013; Matvey et al., 2001). However, the 
results of Experiment 1b provide evidence against this hypothesis; despite producing a general 
mnemonic advantage for emotional relative to neutral images, the results again failed to replicate 
























CHAPTER 4: EXPERIMENT 2 
 The results of the prior two experiments suggest that the disgust advantage may either not 
be replicable, or that the disgust advantage may not be robust to seemingly minor changes in 
experimental procedures. However, before drawing such a conclusion, it is important that 
remaining explanations for the current failure to replicate be ruled out. In particular, Experiment 
1b differed from Chapman’s (2018; Experiment 1) recent demonstration of the disgust advantage 
in two ways: 1) in Experiment 1b encoding was intentional, whereas in Chapman’s experiment 
encoding was incidental, and 2) in Experiment 1b participants simply studied the images, 
whereas in Chapman’s experiment participants completed a line discrimination task (LDT) 
meant to assess attention bias toward the emotional images. The potential importance of these 
differences is considered below. 
 In Chapman’s study (2018; Experiment 1) participants encoded the images incidentally, 
without any awareness of the impending recall test. In contrast, in both Experiments 1a and 1b 
participants engaged in intentional encoding; participants were aware that their memory for the 
images would be tested later. This, of course, was necessary in order to have subjects provide 
JOLs and assess their metamemory. Prior to conducting the present experiment, it was unclear 
whether incidental encoding was necessary to observe the disgust advantage, as nearly every 
prior demonstration of the disgust advantage has used incidental encoding (Chapman, 2018; 
Chapman et al., 2013; Charash & McKay, 2002; Croucher et al., 2011; Ferré et al., 2018, but see 
Zhang et al., 2018), and no study to my knowledge has investigated the effects of varying 
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encoding instructions on the disgust advantage directly. The present experiment is therefore the 
first to systematically investigate the effects of encoding instructions on the disgust advantage. 
Because intentional encoding is thought to encourage effortful, elaborative processing to a 
greater extent than incidental encoding (e.g., Block, 2009; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 2014; Talmi, 
2013), it stands to reason that if the disgust advantage is mediated by such controlled processing, 
then intentional encoding may eliminate this effect by encouraging the elaboration of both 
disgusting and frightening images equally.  
 In addition to the encoding instructions, Experiments 1a and 1b differed from Chapman’s 
(2018; Experiment 1) experiment in that participants in Chapman’s study completed the LDT 
during encoding. Briefly, the LDT entails presenting horizontal lines either above or below the 
studied images. Participants are tasked with indicating the location of the line as quickly as 
possible (see Method below). To the extent that emotional images capture attention, one would 
expect these images to interfere with task performance, resulting in slower reaction times for 
emotional compared to neutral trials. Because a prior study which manipulated whether or not 
participants completed the LDT during encoding found that the disgust advantage appeared in 
both groups (Chapman et al., 2013; Experiment 3), it was not predicted that this methodological 
detail would be necessary to observe the effect. Even so, the present experiment included the 
LDT to more closely replicate Chapman’s (2018; Experiment 1) procedures.  
 A primary goal of Experiment 2 was therefore to serve as a direct replication of 
Chapman’s (2018) Experiment 1, the experiment on which the present study was based, in order 
to provide a stronger test of whether the disgust advantage is replicable. In Experiment 2, 
encoding (intention vs. incidental) was manipulated between-subjects such that one group was 
made aware of the upcoming memory test and the other group was unaware of the memory test. 
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Both groups completed the LDT. The intentional condition provides a direct replication of 
Chapman’s procedures, and the addition of an intentional encoding group allows me to isolate 
the cause of a successful replication, should one occur. If the study included only an incidental 
group who completing the LDT (the direct replication of Chapman’s procedures) and 
subsequently replicated the disgust advantage, it would be unclear whether incidental encoding 
or the LDT were responsible for the successful replication.  
 The current design allows for more informative conclusions. If the disgust advantage 
should occur for the incidental group but not the intentional group, this would suggest that 
incidental encoding is necessary to observe the disgust advantage. If the effect should occur for 
both groups, this would suggest that the LDT is necessary, as Experiment 1b was identical to the 
intentional condition except for the LDT. In contrast, if the disgust advantage does not occur for 
either group, this would suggest that the disgust advantage is not replicable even in a quite 
narrow sense, as the incidental group is effectively a direct replication of Chapman’s (2018; 
Experiment 1) procedures.  
 In addition to assessing the mnemonic effects of discrete emotions, the inclusion of the 
LDT in Experiment 2 allowed me to investigate the attentional effects of discrete emotions. 
Chapman (2018; Experiment 1) found evidence using the LDT that participants allocate greater 
attention to disgusting images compared to frightening images, and suggested that these 
attentional differences mediate the mnemonic advantage for disgust (see Chapman et al., 2013 
for similar results using the LDT). The claim that disgusting information attracts greater attention 
than frightening information is consistent with past research (e.g., Carretié et al., 2011; Ciesielski 
et al., 2010; Cisler et al., 2009; Krusemark & Li, 2011; Van Hooff et al., 2013, but see Zimmer et 
al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017). As such, a secondary goal of Experiment 2 was to test the 
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replicability of Chapman’s (2018; Experiment 1) LDT results, and build upon research on 
disgust and attention more broadly. 
 Lastly, the manipulation of encoding allowed for the examination of an additional issue 
of interest: the effects of encoding instructions on emotional memory in general. It has been 
claimed that emotionally induced memory effects are stronger during incidental compared to 
intentional encoding, as intentional encoding may encourage the deep, elaborative processing of 
non-emotional materials and – as a result – increase their memorability to a level on par with 
emotional materials (Talmi, 2013). Indeed, such a claim is supported by research demonstrating 
that the mnemonic advantage for emotional relative to neutral information is larger under 
conditions of shallow encoding (Jay et al., 2008; Ritchey et al., 2011), which incidental encoding 
is thought to encourage.  
 Yet despite the intuitive nature of this argument, what little evidence exists which directly 
speaks to this claim is somewhat mixed. Although D'Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) 
found that memory for contextual information was better for emotional relative to neutral words 
during incidental but not intention encoding8, the effect of emotion on spatial memory was not 
moderated by encoding instructions. In contrast, Preuß et al. (2009) manipulated encoding 
instructions (intentional vs. incidental) between-subjects and found that the effect of emotion on 
recall performance (i.e. item memory) did not interact with encoding instructions, suggesting that 
the size of the mnemonic advantage of emotion did not differ between conditions. Thus, given 
the claim that emotionally enhanced memory is stronger during incidental encoding and the 
paucity of evidence which directly supports this claim, a secondary goal of Experiment 2 was to 
test the effect of encoding instructions on emotionally enhanced memory. 
 
8 In D'Argembeau and Van der Linden’s (2004) studies, encoding instructions manipulated whether participants 




 In the prior two experiments, we determined our sample size using a priori power 
analyses based on the main effect of emotion on recall reported by Chapman (2018; Experiment; 
η2p = 0.33). Thus far we have consistently observed this main effect of emotion. For Experiment 
2, we chose instead to determine our sample size based on the effect size of the difference 
between recall for disgusting and frightening images, as this difference was the primary effect of 
interest. Based on this effect size (dz = 0.51), to achieve at least 80% power requires 33 subjects 
in each group. As such, I initially planned to collect 35 subject per group. However, because the 
COVID-19 pandemic forced me to stop collecting data midway through the semester, the present 
experiment contains data from 62 undergraduate students who were compensated for their 
participation with course credit (31 per group). Post-hoc power analyses indicated that this 
sample size resulted in 78.46% power in each group to detect Chapman’s difference in recall 
between disgusting and frightening images. 
Design and Materials 
  The design of Experiment 2 was a 3 (Emotion: disgust, fear, neutral; within-subjects) x 2 
(Encoding: intentional vs. incidental; between-subjects) mixed design. Studied images were 
identical to prior experiments. 
Procedure  
 Participants began by completing the encoding phase. Participants were told that during 
this task, they would see a series of images appear on the screen, each with a horizontal line 
either above it or below it. Participants were instructed to indicate the location of this line as 
 
9 Preregistration materials for Experiment 2 are available at: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=n3pz4y  
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quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the up arrow if the line appeared above the image, 
and the down arrow if the line appeared below the image. Additionally, participants were asked 
to keep their eyes focused on the images throughout the duration of the task. 
 As in prior experiments, images were displayed for 2 s and were separated by a 500 ms 
interstimulus interval. Each image was displayed for 2 s regardless of how quickly participants 
made the response to the LDT, and participants did not receive feedback on their performance. 
The dimensions of the horizontal lines in the present study were chosen to match the dimensions 
of Chapman’s (2018; Experiment 1) lines relative to the size of the images in our prior two 
experiments. More specifically, the proportionate size of the lines relative to the images was 
0.375 x 0.0083̅. Each line orientation (above vs. below) appeared equally often within each of 
the three emotional categories. Additionally, line position was counterbalanced such that a given 
image had a horizontal line above it in one list and below it in the other list. As in prior 
experiments, images appeared in a new random order for each participant. 
 For participants in the intentional group, the experimenter explained that – in addition to 
completing the LDT – participants were to study the images for a memory test which would 
occur 45 minutes after the LDT. In contrast, participants in the incidental group were not 
informed that there would be a memory test and were simply instructed to complete the LDT.  
 The remainder of the experimental procedures (i.e. the retention interval, the recall test, 
and the stimulus rating phase) were identical to prior experiments.  
Data Analysis 
 Reaction time data for the LDT were trimmed according to the procedures described by 
Chapman (2018; Experiment 1). Specifically, only reaction times for correct trials were 
analyzed. Removing trials with incorrect responses resulted in a loss of 3.02% of trials (not 
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including the two excluded participants, see Footnote 10). Additionally, reaction times which 
were more than two standard deviations away from each participant’s grand mean were 
excluded. Removing these extreme trials resulted in a loss of an additional 4.26% of trials. In 
total, 7.14% of trials were removed prior to conducting the reaction time analyses. Similar to 
Chapman, mean reaction times were used in the LDT analyses. 
Results  
Recall10 
 I began by analyzing the proportion of pictures recalled with a 3 (Emotion: disgusting, 
frightening, neutral; within-subjects) x 2 (Encoding: intentional vs. incidental; between-subjects) 
mixed ANOVA (see Figure 4). There was a significant effect of Emotion [F(1.83, 109.99) = 
60.05, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.500]. As in previous experiments, both frightening and disgusting 
images were better remembered than neutral images (both p’s < 0.001). In this experiment – 
however – the disgust advantage was replicated: disgusting images were better remembered than 
frightening images (p < 0.001). The effects of Encoding and the Encoding by Emotion 







10 One participant who became uncomfortable upon seeing the emotional images requested to take a break midway 
through the encoding phase. Due to an error in the experimental program, the program terminated instead of 
resuming where this participant left off in the LDT, and this participant completed the LDT in its entirety from the 
beginning. As such, this participant received additional exposure to some of the studied images. Because sensitivity 
analyses indicated that the results of this experiment did not change when this participant was excluded, this 
participant’s data was retained in the analysis of recall data. 
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Figure 4 
Recall by Emotion and Encoding in Experiment 2 
 
Note. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. 
Line Discrimination Task11 
 Reaction times were submitted to a 3 (Emotion: disgusting, frightening, neutral; within-
subjects) x 2 (Encoding: intentional vs. incidental; between-subjects) mixed ANOVA (see Figure 
5). There was a marginal effect of Encoding, indicating that participants were slower in the 
intentional condition compared to the incidental condition [F(1, 58) = 3.98, p = 0.051, η2p = 
 
11 One participant had an accuracy of 0% because this participant never made a response. Another participant with 
an accuracy of 0% appears to have reversed the keys associated with the corresponding correct response (e.g., the 
participant pressed the up arrow for trials in which the line appeared below the image). As such, both subjects were 
excluded from all LDT analyses. Because excluding these participants did not change the recall results, these 
participants were included in the previously-reported recall analyses. 
Incidental Intentional
















0.064]. There was also a main effect of Emotion [F(2, 116) = 15.76, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.214]. 
Post-hoc tests showed that participants were slower to respond during trials containing both 
frightening and disgusting images compared to trials containing neutral images (both p’s < 
0.001). However, participants did not differ in their reaction times for trials containing 
frightening and disgusting images (p = 1.000). Additionally, the Encoding by Emotion 
interaction was non-significant (F = 0.47, p = 0.629). 
Table 3 
Mean (SD) Reaction Times (ms) for the LDT by Emotion and Encoding in Experiment 2 
 Emotion Category 
Encoding  Disgusting Frightening Neutral 
Incidental 714.84 (269.49) 701.24 (286.10) 669.04 (264.82) 
Intentional 865.41 (325.76) 863.02 (326.98) 812.88 (309.55) 
 
Stimulus Ratings12 
 Next, the stimulus ratings for valence, arousal, fear, and disgust were analyzed using 
repeated-measures ANOVAs with Emotion (3) as a factor (see Table 3). There was a significant 
effect of Emotion on valence ratings [F(1.79, 104.06) = 327.91, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.850]. Post-hoc 
tests revealed that neutral images were rated as more positively valenced than both frightening 
and disgusting images (both p’s < 0.001). Frightening and disgusting images did not differ in 
valence (p = 1.000). Similarly, there was a significant effect of Emotion on arousal ratings 
[F(1.70, 98.68) = 205.15, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.780]. Post-hoc tests revealed that neutral images 
 
12 One participant who reported frequently reversing the rating scale for valence was excluded from analyses of 
stimulus ratings. Additionally, two subjects became distressed and left prior to the stimulus rating phase (but after 
the recall phase). 
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were rated as less arousing than both frightening and disgusting images (both p’s < 0.001). 
Additionally, frightening images were rated as more arousing than disgusting images (p < 0.001). 
There was a significant effect of Emotion on fear ratings [F(2, 116) = 351.43, p < 001, η2p = 
0.858]. Neutral images were rated as being less frightening than both frightening and disgusting 
images (both p’s < 0.001), and frightening images were rated as more frightening than disgusting 
images (p < 0.001). Lastly, there was a significant effect of Emotion on disgust ratings [F(2, 116) 
= 334.75, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.852]. Neutral images were rated as less disgusting than both 
frightening and disgusting images (both p’s < 0.001), and disgusting images were rated as more 
disgusting than frightening images (p < 0.001). Finally, a paired t-test found that – unlike in 
Experiments 1a and 1b – disgusting images were rated as more disgusting than frightening 
images were rated as frightening [t(58) = 2.15, p = 0.036]. 
Table 4  
Mean (SD) Valence, Arousal, Fear, and Disgust Ratings for Images in Experiment 2 
 Emotion Category 
Rating Disgusting Frightening Neutral 
Valence 2.25 (0.64) 2.28 (0.60) 4.72 (0.57) 
Arousal 4.58 (0.80) 5.29 (0.77) 2.76 (0.70) 
Fear 4.02 (1.25) 5.00 (1.13) 1.38 (0.46) 
Disgust 5.28 (1.08) 3.02 (1.30) 1.24 (0.39) 
 
Discussion 
 The primary result of Experiment 2 was that – unlike in Experiments 1a and 1b – the 
disgust advantage was successfully replicated. This effect was characterized by greater recall 
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performance for disgusting compared to frightening images. Because the disgust advantage 
appeared regardless of whether participants engaged in intentional or incidental encoding (i.e. the 
effect of emotion did not interact with encoding type), it appears that incidental encoding is not 
necessary to replicate this effect. Instead, it appears that the reason that the disgust advantage 
was not replicated in prior experiments was that these experiments did not utilize the LDT at 
encoding. I will refrain from speculating as to why this methodological detail is of importance 
until the General Discussion. Although the disgust advantage appears to be a replicable 
phenomenon, the present investigation suggests that boundary conditions such the task which 
participants engage in during encoding may constrain its appearance. 
 The results of the LDT revealed that participants were slower to indicate the location of 
the line during trials with emotional images compared to trials with neutral images. Such results 
suggest that the emotional images in the present study captured participants’ attention to a 
greater extent than the neutral images did. These results are consistent with prior research, which 
has consistently demonstrated that emotional information captures attention and interferes with 
ongoing task performance to a greater extent than non-emotional information (for a review, see 
Carretié, 2014). 
 Although the results of the LDT are consistent with the literature on emotion and 
attention at large, Experiment 2’s LDT results are inconsistent with those reported by Chapman. 
Specifically, although Chapman has found that participants are slower during trials which 
contain disgusting images compared to trials which contain frightening images (e.g., Chapman, 
2018; Chapman et al., 2013), the present experiment found no significant difference between 
these emotional categories in terms of task interference. Broadly speaking, although some prior 
research indicates that disgusting information captures more attention than frightening 
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information (Carretié et al., 2011; Ciesielski et al., 2010; Cisler et al., 2009; Krusemark & Li, 
2011; Van Hooff et al., 2013), this is not always found (Zimmer et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2017). 
For example, in Zhang et al.’s study participants viewed briefly presented pairs of emotional and 
neutral faces and responded to geometric targets presented behind one face or the other. Whereas 
reaction times for trials with disgusted faces were quicker if the object was positioned on the side 
of the screen which the neutral face had previously occupied, the opposite was found for trials 
with fearful faces. Such results suggest that – at least under some circumstances – frightening 
information may capture attention to a greater extent than disgusting information (see Zimmer et 
al., 2016 for similar results using auditory stimuli). Reconciling these disparate results will be an 
important challenge for researchers in this domain.  
 Alternatively, it is possible that the lack of a difference in attention capture by disgusting 
and frightening images in the present study is due to the greater arousal of the frightening images 
used. That is, although disgusting information may be more attention capturing than frightening 
information, the competing effects of arousal on attention may have obscured my ability to 
detect this effect. Support for this conclusion comes from a study by Schimmack and Derryberry 
(2005), who found that negative images with higher arousal slow line detection to a greater 
extent than negative images with lower arousal. As such, it appears that participants’ attention is 
sensitive to differences in stimulus arousal, and it is therefore possible that the confound in 
arousal between disgusting and frightening images explains our inability to replicate Chapman’s 
LDT results (Chapman, 2018; Chapman et al., 2013). Even so, Chapman (2018; Experiment 1) 
found greater task interference for disgusting images relative to frightening images using the 
LDT regardless of the fact that participants rated the frightening images as more arousing. 
Although it is therefore plausible that the confound in arousal between disgusting and frightening 
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images interfered with our ability to replicate Chapman’s LDT results, prior research indicates 
that this explanation may not fully account for the failure to replicate. 
 Whatever the reason for our failure to replicate the increased attention bias toward 
disgusting images, it is interesting to note that the mnemonic advantage for disgust was observed 
in the absence of a significant difference in attentional bias between frightening and disgusting 
images during encoding. Such results suggest that greater attention for disgusting relative to 
frightening images is not a prerequisite for observing the mnemonic advantage for disgust. If this 
is the case, it may be that attentional bias is one of multiple mediators of the disgust advantage, 
with differential attentional bias towards frightening and disgusting information contributing to 
and perhaps amplifying the disgust advantage when present (Chapman, 2018; Experiment 1), but 
not preventing the disgust advantage when absent. 
 A final goal of Experiment 2 was to test the claim that emotionally enhanced memory 
effects are stronger under incidental compared to intentional encoding (Talmi, 2013). This claim 
seems convincing given the argument that incidental encoding may encourage shallow 
processing, coupled with research demonstrating that emotionally enhanced memory effects are 
larger when participants engage in shallow encoding (Jay et al., 2008; Ritchey et al., 2011). Even 
so, the results of Experiment 2 argue against this claim, as the size of the mnemonic advantage 
for emotion did not differ between encoding conditions as demonstrated by the nonsignificant 
interaction between emotion and encoding type. Such results mirror the findings of Preuß et al. 
(2009), who similarly manipulated encoding type between-subjects and failed to observe an 
interaction between emotion and encoding type on participants’ recall performance for images. 
Although it is possible that incidental encoding enhances the effects of emotion on memory in 
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certain circumstances or for certain types of materials, the present results cast doubt on the 


























CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 Initially, the goal of the present investigation was to investigate the effects of stimulus 
emotionality on metamemorial judgments. More specifically, I sought to determine whether 
participants are sensitive to the mnemonic effects of discrete emotions when predicting their 
memory performance. This question was motivated by research demonstrating that participants 
are sensitive to mnemonic cues that reflect aspects of the stimulus to be remembered (Koriat, 
1997), including whether the stimulus is emotional or non-emotional (Hourihan & Bursey, 2017; 
Hourihan et al., 2017; Nomi et al., 2013; Tauber & Dunlosky, 2012; Tauber et al., 2017; 
Witherby & Tauber, 2018; Zimmerman & Kelley, 2010). Given that discrete emotions have been 
shown to affect a participant’s likelihood of remembering a stimulus above and beyond affective 
dimensions such as valence and arousal with disgusting stimuli being better remembered than 
frightening stimuli (Chapman, 2018; Chapman et al., 2013; Charash & McKay, 2002; Croucher 
et al., 2011; Ferré et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018), the present investigation sought to determine 
whether participants would incorporate this mnemonic advantage for disgusting information into 
their metamemorial judgments. However, because the disgust advantage did not replicate in 
Experiment 1a, subsequent experiments were concerned with determining the reasons for this 
failure to replicate. 
 Experiment 1b was designed to test whether the initial failure to replicate the disgust 
advantage was due to the inclusion of JOLs. It was reasoned that – because the presence of JOLs 
has been shown to eliminate otherwise robust memory effects (e.g., Begg et al., 1991; Besken & 
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Mulligan, 2013; Matvey et al., 2001) – the inclusion of JOLs in Experiment 1a may have 
interfered with the appearance of the disgust advantage. However, this hypothesis was proven 
unlikely, as Experiment 1a likewise failed to replicate the disgust advantage despite the removal 
of JOLs. 
 Experiment 2 was therefore designed to serve as a more direct replication of Chapman’s 
(2018; Experiment 1) procedures; in Experiment 2, participants completed the LDT meant to 
assess attention biases toward the emotional images. Additionally, encoding type was 
manipulated such that one group was made aware of the impending memory test and another was 
unaware of the memory test. Because the disgust advantage was replicated regardless of whether 
encoding was intentional or incidental, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that the LDT may be 
necessary to observe the disgust advantage using the present materials. In order to provide 
additional support for the notion that the LDT is necessary to observing the disgust advantage, I 
compared memory for disgusting vs. frightening images across experiments using a 2 
(Experiment: 2 vs. 1b) by 2 (Emotion: disgusting vs. frightening) mixed ANOVA. Consistent 
with the idea that the LDT contributed to the detection of the disgust advantage, there was a 
significant interaction between Experiment and Emotion [F(1, 85) = 4.64, p = 0.034, η2p = 
0.052], indicating that whereas participants remembered more disgusting compared to 
frightening images in Experiment 2 [F(1, 61) = 21.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.260], recall did not 
differ between the two categories in Experiment 1b (F = 0.41, p = 0.529).  
 Because Chapman et al. (2013; Experiment 3) found the disgust advantage for 
recognition memory regardless of whether participants completed the LDT, it was not predicted 
a priori that this methodological detail was crucial to observe the effect. As such, the 
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speculations that follow as to why this detail may have accounted for the initial failures to 
replicate the effect are post hoc.  
 The most plausible explanation as to why the LDT may be necessary to observe the 
disgust advantage has to do with the nature of the LDT. In essence, the LDT might be thought of 
as a form of divided attention (DA), in which participants must simultaneously focus on each 
centrally presented image and at the same time indicate the location of the line. As such, 
participants who encode images while completing the LDT experience a situation in which their 
attentional resources are divided between the ongoing LDT and the images onscreen. It may be 
that this type of encoding impairs memory for frightening information to a greater degree than 
for disgusting information. In support of this claim, the majority of studies which have 
demonstrated the disgust advantage have utilized some form of DA task at encoding (e.g., 
Chapman, 2018; Chapman et al., 2013; Charash & McKay, 2002; Ferré et al., 2018, but see 
Croucher et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2018). 
 The claim that the LDT – and by extension DA – is necessary to observe the disgust 
advantage seems at odds with Chapman et al.’s (2013; Experiment 3) results in that these authors 
found the disgust advantage regardless of whether participants engaged in the LDT. One 
potential explanation for these discrepant results is that the disgust advantage simply may not be 
replicable under conditions of full attention. Future work addressing this possibility seems 
warranted. Another potential explanation relates to a difference between Chapman et al.’s 
procedures and those of the present investigation: participants in Chapman et al.’s study 
completed a recognition test, whereas participants in the present studies completed a recall test. 
Prior research has shown that recognition memory is less resource demanding than recall, and – 
at least when attention is manipulated at retrieval – recognition tends to be less sensitive to the 
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effects of DA on memory performance (Baddeley et al., 1984; Craik et al., 1996). Because 
recognition tests are less sensitive to the effects of DA than recall tests, it is possible that whether 
or not participants encode information under full or divided attention is more important when 
examining mnemonic effects such as the disgust advantage using recall tests compared to 
recognition tests. 
 Why might it be that the disgust advantage is more likely to manifest when participants 
encode information under situations of DA? First, if – as suggested by prior research (Carretié et 
al., 2011; Ciesielski et al., 2010; Cisler et al., 2009; Krusemark & Li, 2011; Van Hooff et al., 
2013) – disgusting information truly attracts attention to a greater degree than frightening 
information, it stands to reason that distracting secondary tasks may be less likely to pull 
participants’ attention away from disgusting information. In other words, attending to disgusting 
information may be somewhat compulsory, with the attentional system giving high priority to 
disgust even when participants are confronted with effortful secondary tasks. If the increased 
attentional capture of disgusting information relative to frightening information makes disgusting 
information more resistant to the harmful effects of DA at encoding, one would expect the 
disgust advantage in memory to be stronger in situations of DA.  
 Although this explanation is plausible, it is difficult to reconcile with the lack of a 
significant difference in attention toward frightening and disgusting images in Experiment 2. 
Alternatively, it may be that the mechanisms which mediate disgust-memory are different from 
those that mediate fear-memory, and that the mechanisms mediating the former are less 
dependent on the availability of attentional resources than those mediating the latter. Stated 
differently, the mechanisms which underly disgust-memory may be less controlled and resource-
demanding than those which underly fear-memory. In support of the idea that memory for 
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different types of emotional material differs in terms of automaticity, Kensinger and Corkin 
(2004) found that memory for negative non-arousing material is disrupted by DA whereas 
memory for negative arousing material is not. It may therefore be that the mechanisms which 
mediate disgust-memory are relatively more resistant to DA than those mediating fear-memory.13 
 If disgust-memory does indeed rely upon processes which are relatively less resource-
dependent than fear-memory, it is natural to wonder what these mechanisms might be. Although 
a number of authors have suggested that the disgust advantage may be due to increased attention 
at encoding for disgusting compared to frightening information (Chapman, 2018; Marchewka et 
al., 2016, but see Chapman et al., 2013), other candidate mechanisms have been put forth. For 
example, some have suggested that disgusting information may be more memorable than 
frightening information because it is higher in impact (Chapman et al., 2013; Croucher et al., 
2011), a construct originating from photojournalism which characterizes images which have a 
striking, eye-catching nature, perhaps because these images are appraised as being of immediate 
significance to the observer (Ewbank et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2010). Given the paucity of 
research on emotional memory and impact (e.g., Ramponi et al., 2010), an important challenge 
for future research will be to better characterize the role of impact as a mediator of the disgust 
advantage, as well as to determine whether the effects of impact on disgust-memory operate in a 
relatively automatic, resource-sparing manner. Alternatively, given that images high in impact 
have been defined as those which are “eye-catching” (Murphy et al., 2010), it is possible that 
impact simply measures participants’ subjective awareness that certain emotionally charged 
 
13 The fact that more arousing stimuli were more resistant to DA is somewhat problematic for the claim that 
differential resistance to DA at encoding between disgusting and frightening information explains our prior failures 
to replicate the disgust advantage given that the frightening images in the present study were consistently rated as 
more arousing than the disgusting images. However, it is possible that whatever aspects of disgusting stimuli cause 
them to be particularly DA-resistant were sufficiently strong as to overcome the confound of arousal in the present 
study.  
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images are likely to capture their attention. Future research should test this possibility by 
investigating whether impact mediates the disgust advantage or has effects on emotional memory 
more generally after taking objective measures of attention bias into account. 
 When considering the differences between Experiment 2 and Experiments 1a and 1b, one 
final difference of potential importance remains: Experiment 2 was conducted during the 
outbreak and escalation of the COVID-19 pandemic. More specifically, data collection for 
Experiment 2 occurred between January 15, 2020 and March 6, 2020. Although speculative, it is 
plausible that during times of pandemic, people are more sensitive to disgust. The amount of 
disgust evoked by an image of a medical procedure or a contaminant – for example – may be 
elevated during periods of time in which threats of illness are particularly salient in the general 
public. If this is the case, it is possible that such heightened disgust sensitivity may have 
downstream consequences on the processing of disgusting stimuli, perhaps increasing their 
memorability in a way which facilitated the detection of the disgust advantage in Experiment 2. 
To test this hypothesis, I conducted an analysis based on the date that participants completed the 
study, in which participants who participated between January 15 and February 7 were assigned 
to an “early” group and participants who participated between February 10 and March 6 were 
assigned to a “late” group. A mixed ANOVA of the recall data from Experiment 2 with Emotion 
(3; within-subjects) and Date (2: early vs. late; between-subjects) revealed no effect of Date (F = 
0.24, p = 0.628) and a nonsignificant interaction between Date and Emotion (F = 0.11, p = 
0.879). Additionally, I analyzed the average disgust recall data using a regression analysis with 
Date as a continuous (i.e. non-dichotomized) predictor. Similar to the ANOVA results, Date did 
not significantly predict average disgust recall (t = 1.04, p = 0.302). Although such results 
suggest that COVID-19 may not have had an impact on the results of Experiment 2 over the 
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course of data collection, it is possible that the mere awareness and discussion of the virus 
resulted in an increase in disgust sensitivity that did not escalate quantitatively until sometime 
following data collection. Further research on the effects of pandemics and other naturally 
occurring contamination-based threats on the information processing of disgusting information 
seems warranted.   
 The primary limitation of the present investigation is that – contrary to the pilot results 
reported by Chapman (2018) – the frightening images used were consistently rated as more 
arousing than the disgusting images used. Such a confound makes it difficult to isolate the effect 
of interest (i.e. the effect of discrete negative emotions on memory and metamemory). A 
challenge for researchers in this area will be to develop stimulus sets which eliminate such 
confounds, and do so consistently across samples. 
 In light of the present results, a number of future directions for research in this area are 
suggested. First, given the finding that the LDT may be necessary to observe the disgust 
advantage in image recall, future research should aim to more formally test the hypothesis that 
the disgust advantage is stronger under conditions of DA. Such research would allow for a 
deeper investigation into the mechanisms which mediate the disgust advantage. Additionally, 
now that it has been determined that the disgust advantage can be replicated using intentional 
encoding, future research will be better poised to determine whether the disgust advantage 
extends to metamemorial judgments by adopting methods which resemble those used in 
Experiment 2.  
 In conclusion, the present investigation demonstrates that – although the disgust 
advantage appears to be highly replicable based on the extant literature (Chapman, 2018; 
Chapman et al., 2013; Charash & McKay, 2002; Croucher et al., 2011; Ferré et al., 2018; Zhang 
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et al., 2018, but see Marchewka et al., 2016) – there are situations in which the effect is unlikely 
to occur (i.e. under conditions of full attention). In time, other boundary conditions which 
constrain this effect may appear, shedding further light upon the mechanisms which explain and 
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